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This study introduces split population binary choice models to address the issue of irrelevant dyads in the dyadic analysis of conflict with binary dependent variables. The advantage of employing a statistical model instead of directly identifying relevant dyads manifests itself in the selection of relevant dyads: rather than researchers making take-it-or-leave-it decisions, covariates are used to estimate relevance as a latent variable. An application of the model to the trade conflict debate shows that the unconditional probability of conflict, the quantity of interest for traditional binary choice models based on all dyads, is non-monotonic with respect to trade when generated by the split population model. This finding provides one explanation for why trade is found either to increase or decrease the probability of conflict in existing research, as monotonicity by chance is imposed on an underlying non-monotonic relationship. Adapted from the source document.

We join the debate on trade interdependence and conflict with a reexamination of Barbieri's (1996) intriguing empirical results showing that under certain circumstances, trade interdependence causes conflict. We argue that these findings resulted from a specification that was missing a variable. We return to Barbieri's models and introduce two independent power measures for countries within each dyad. When a correctly specified trade-conflict regression model incorporating the new power variables is performed, the constraining effect of interdependence becomes evident, and the results obtained are the reverse of Barbieri's.

AbstractThis article shows that the opportunity costs resulting from economic interdependence decrease the probability of war in an incomplete information game. This result is strongly consistent with existing empirical analyses of the inverse trade-conflict relationship but is the opposite of the conclusion reached by Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, who reject the opportunity cost argument in a game-theoretic framework. As a result of our findings, one cannot dismiss the opportunity cost argument as the explanation why trading nations fight less. Instead our study reaffirms the central position of opportunity costs as the basis for the inverse trade-conflict relationship, thus implying that one need not rely on signaling.

Existing studies of the impact of economic development on political trust in China have two major gaps: they fail to explain how economic development contributes to the hierarchical trust pattern, and they do not pay enough attention to the underlying mechanisms. In light of cultural theory and political control theory, we propose adapting performance theory into a theory of "asymmetrical attribution of performance" to better illuminate the case of China. This adapted theory leads to dual pathway theses: expectation fulfillment and local blaming. Using a multilevel mediation model, we show that expectation fulfillment mainly upholds trust in the central government, whereas local blaming undermines trust in local governments. We also uncover a rural–urban distinction in the dual pathway, revealing that both theses are more salient among rural Chinese.